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MANDATORY SENTENCING FOR HABITUAL
JUVENILE OFFENDERS: PEOPLE V. J.A.
The Illinois General Assembly designed the Juvenile Court Act' to protect
and rehabilitate juveniles.2 The primary purpose of the Juvenile Court Act
was rehabilitative and preventative rather than punitive.' In response to the
increase in violent juvenile crimes, however, the Illinois General Assembly
enacted the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act (Act), 4 which subjects "habitual
juvenile offenders" to mandatory incarceration in a correctional facility until
the age of twenty-one.- The Act defines habitual juvenile offenders as
juveniles with three adjudications of delinquency. 6 The first two adjudications
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
2. The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is stated as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and
guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the moral, emotional, mental
and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community; to
preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him
from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection
of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and, when the
minor is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody, care and discipline
as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should be given by his parents, and
in cases where it should and can properly be done to place the minor in a family
home so that he may become a member of the family by legal adoption or otherwise.
Id. § 701-2(1). See also Jackson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 41 Ill. App. 3d 87, 92, 353 N.E.2d
331, 335 (Ist Dist. 1976) (discussing Juvenile Court Act).
3. See In re T.D., 81 111. App. 3d 369, 372, 401 N.E.2d 275, 277 (2d Dist. 1980).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
5. Id. Section 705-12(a) provides in pertinent part: "Any minor adjudged an Habitual
Juvenile Offender shall be committed to the Department of Corrections until his 21st birthday,
without possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence . Id.
6. Id. Section 705-12(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any minor having been twice adjudicated a delinquent minor for offenses which,
had he been prosecuted as an adult, would have been felonies under the laws of
this State, and who is thereafter adjudicated a delinquent minor for a third time
shall be adjudged an Habitual Juvenile Offender where:
I. the third adjudication is for an offense occurring after adjudication on
the second; and
2. the second adjudication was for an offense occurring after adjudica-
tion on the first; and
3. the third offense occurred after January 1, 1980; and
4. the third offense was based upon the commission of or attempted com-
mission of the following offenses: murder; voluntary or involuntary
manslaughter; criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault;
aggravated or heinous battery involving permanent disability or disfigurement
or great bodily harm to the victim; burglary of a home or other residence in-
tended for use as a temporary or permanent dwelling place for human beings;
home invasion; robbery or armed robbery; or aggravated arson.
Id.
Traditionally, the definition of "delinquency" included both criminal conduct and noncriminal
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must be for offenses that, had the juvenile been prosecuted as an adult,
would have been felonies. 7 The third adjudication of delinquency must be
for the commission of certain felonies for which juveniles may be tried as
adults.'
Recently, in People v. J.A., 9 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District held that a juvenile offender with two adjudications of delinquency
was, at age thirteen, subject to sentencing under the Habitual Juvenile
Offender Act.' 0 The court also held that an eight-year sentence imposed on
a habitual juvenile offender was not cruel and unusual punishment." After
examining the history and philosophy of the juvenile court system, this
Recent Case addresses three problems with the court's decision in J.A. First,
the court misapplied the plain meaning rule, a doctrine of statutory inter-
pretation, in its reading of the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act.' 2 Second,
conduct. The latter group included conduct by juveniles who violated specific ordinances
applicable only to children, such as truancy, alcohol, or curfew ordinances. Delinquency also
included non-criminal conduct by juveniles who were not in violation of any law, but were
designated as "beyond control," "incorrigible," "runaway," "ungovernable," "minors in need
of supervision" (MINS), or "persons in need of supervision" (PINS). S. Fox, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE 254 (1972).
Today, most juvenile court codes, in an attempt to destigmatize noncriminal conduct, limit
the definition of "delinquency" to acts that violate state or federal law, or local ordinance. S.
DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 18 (1974). See ALA. CODE 12-15-
1(8) (1975), ALASKA STAT. 47.10.010(a)(1) (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(8) (1977);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-403(2) (Supp. 1983); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT.. § 19-1-103(9)(a) (1978); CONN. GEN STAT. § 46b-120 (Supp. 1984); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2301(7) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(8) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §
24A-401(6)(A) (1984); IDAHO CODE § 16-1803 (Supp. 1984) (no definition of delinquency given,
but court's jurisdiction is apparently limited to violations of law); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §
702-2 (1983); IOWA CODE § 232.2(12) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(b) (1981); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 3101(2), 3103(1) (1980 & Supp. 1985) (jurisdiction of juvenile court
limited to delinquent conduct or acts that are criminal when committed by adults); MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(k) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51 (West
1969); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-103(12) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040(1)(c) (1983); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:2(111) (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3(0) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
7A-517(12) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(3) (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.02 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101(b) (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302
(Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-3(F) (1981 & Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 26-8-7 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(8) (1984); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03(a)
(Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(a)(3) (1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-
228(H) (1982 & Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.020(1), (11), (13-15) (Supp. 1985)
(uses term "offense" to refer to violations of law, and terms "serious offender," "juvenile
offender," "minor or first offender," to designate classes of children who commit offenses);
WIS. STAT. § 48.12(1) (1979 & Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-201(a)(ix) (1978).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
8. These offenses are murder, manslaughter, sexual assault, aggravated battery, burglary,
home invasion, robbery, and aggravated arson. Id.
9. 127 Ill. App. 3d 811, 469 N.E.2d 449 (Ist Dist. 1984).
10. Id. at 813-14, 469 N.E.2d at 451.
11. Id. at 814-15, 469 N.E.2d at 452.
12. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
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the court's cruel and unusual punishment analysis was incomplete and in-
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Solem v.
Helm,'3 which mandates proportionality of sentencing. Finally, the J.A.
decision conflicts with the underlying policies of the juvenile court system;14
the decision will promote sentence disparity in juvenile adjudications. The
J.A. court's emphasis on protecting society will frustrate the underlying
rehabilitative policy of the juvenile court system.
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
Until the nineteenth century, states treated juvenile offenders the same as
they treated adult offenders. 5 In American common law, juveniles younger
than age seven were incapable of committing crimes. Juveniles between the
ages of seven and fourteen, by contrast, were merely presumed incapable of
committing crimes. 6 If the state demonstrated that a juvenile offender
between the ages of seven and fourteen could distinguish between right and
wrong, 7 then the presumption of incapacity was rebutted and the juvenile
stood before the criminal court as an adult. s Since there were no separate
facilities for juveniles, the juvenile offender was sent to a prison for adults.' 9
In the nineteenth century, as a result of deplorable jail conditions,20
reformers sought specialized institutions for juveniles. 2' The movement to-
ward separate treatment of juveniles is believed to have begun in 1824 with
the formation of the House of Refuge in New York.2 2 The founders of the
House of Refuge sought to house, educate, and protect juveniles. 23 The
13. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). See infra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
15. P. PIERSMA, J. GANOUSIS, A. VOLENIK, H. SWANGER, & P. CONNELL, LAW AND TACTICS
IN JUVENILE CASES 3 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as LAW AND TACTICS].
16. Illinois may not prosecute juveniles younger than thirteen years old as adults. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-1 (1983). "No person shall be convicted of any offense unless he had
attained his 13th birthday at the time the offense was committed."
17. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 15, at 3.
18. Id.
19. T. JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1975).
20. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 15, at 3.
21. Id.
22. Act of Mar. 29, 1824, ch. 126, 1824 N.Y. Laws 110. The House of Refuge was designed
to care for all kinds of children, whether neglected, wayward, abandoned, or criminal. See
LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 15, at 3; Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970). Houses of refuge were established in a number of cities by
reformers who were eager to keep juvenile offenders separate from adult criminals. H. Lou,
JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 13-19 (1927). For a historical account of the houses
of refuge, see Mennel, Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing Perspective on the Legal Rights
of Juvenile Delinquents, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 68 (1972).
23. See Note, For Troubled Youth-Help, Not Jail, 31 HASTINcS L.J. 539, 541 (1979)
(reformers were known as "child savers"). For a more detailed discussion of the role of the
child savers during the reform movement, see A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (2d ed. 1977).
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House of Refuge held juveniles convicted of crimes, as well as those who
were abandoned or neglected. 24 The reformers believed that criminal, aban-
doned, or neglected juveniles could be rehabilitated if they were removed
from their community and home environment. The reformers also believed
that the state had a duty to protect the community by intervening in the
lives of criminal or abandoned juveniles.26 The courts soon followed this
idea and began to assume guardianship over juvenile offenders' under the
authority of parens palriae.21 This doctrine empowered the state to separate
juveniles from poor or unfit parents, and to act as a superior parent for
these juveniles.2 1 Under this doctrine, juveniles were treated not as criminals,
but as wards of the state who were not fully responsible for their conduct,
and who were capable of being rehabilitated. 0
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, an effort was underway to
establish a separate system of justice for juveniles.3" In 1899, the State of
Illinois established the first juvenile court in the nation.12 The principal aim
of the Illinois Juvenile Court was the rehabilitation of juveniles.33 Many
24. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 15, at 3.
25. Id. at 4. The reformers believed that only those children who could be rehabilitated
should be committed to the House of Refuge:
This limitation was conceived as a mandate to the courts that they commit to the
House only those who could still be rescued. Those who could not be rescued were
to be prevented from contaminating the saving process. The reformers were con-
vinced that it was necessary to close their House to prematurely corrupted and
corrupting young persons.
Fox, supra note 22, at 1190.
26. S. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 19.
27. Id.
28. Id. The term "parens patriae" is defined as the "role of the state as sovereign and
guardian of persons under legal disability." Note, Juvenile Justice: Procedural Safeguards for
Delinquents at the Adjudicatory Stage-Not for Adults Only, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 288, 291 &
n.32 (1982). The origins of parens patriae can be traced to the feudal days of England when
the English Courts of Chancery asserted guardianship over certain juveniles. The doctrine
became an integral part of the juvenile court system in the United States beginning with Ex
Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). For a detailed discussion of the history of parens patriae
as it relates to the juvenile court system, see Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae:
The State As Parent or Tyrant? 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 895 (1976), Rendleman, Parens Patriae:
From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971), and Note, The Amended
Kansas Juvenile Code: Can Parens Patriae Withstand Due Process? 18 WASHBURN L.J. 244
(1979).
29. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 15, at 4.
30. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (1909). The doctrine of parens
patriae gave rise to the designation of juvenile offenders as delinquents rather than criminals.
See S. BRECKINRIDGE & E. ABBOTT, THE DELINQUENT CHILD AND THE HOME 247 (1970). For a
discussion of the definition of a juvenile delinquent, see supra note 6.
31. Note, supra note 23, at 542.
32. Act of Apr. 21, 1899, 1899 111. Laws 131 (repealed 1965). See Note, supra note 23, at
542.
33. Note, supra note 23, at 542. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2(I) (1983) (purpose of
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states subsequently enacted juvenile court acts that were designed to impress
upon the juvenile courts the objective of rehabilitating the juvenile. 34
THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT
Under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act,15 the state is allowed to prosecute
violent juvenile offenders as adults.16 The decision to prosecute a juvenile as
an adult, however, is not within the sole discretion of the Illinois state's
attorney." The state's attorney's decision is subject to the objection of the
judge presiding in the juvenile division where the case is brought." Although
there is a judicial check on the state's attorney's discretion to prosecute
juveniles as adults, a belligerent states's attorney can petition to prosecute a
juvenile as an adult, even on the juvenile's first offense. 9
Illinois Juvenile Court Act is protection and rehabilitation of juvenile). Rehabilitative goals
were emphasized to such an extent that courts were not concerned with the guilt or innocence
of the child. Note, supra note 23, at 542.
34. Note, supra note 23, at 543. Justice in the contemporary juvenile court system is
administered differently than in the criminal court system. For example, juveniles are charged
with crimes not by complaint, but by petition. W. STAPELTON & L. TErrELBAUM, IN DEFENSE
OF YOUTH 15-16 (1972). Instead of a trial, there is an adjudicatory hearing that is the "functional
equivalent of the trial in the regular criminal or civil process." S. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 124.
At an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court determines such matters as whether the juvenile
committed the alleged delinquent act or, in a neglect or abandonment proceeding, whether the
juvenile is in fact neglected or abandoned. Id. at 123-24. Unlike the criminal system, the rules
of evidence are relaxed at the dispositional hearing, so that the juvenile court can hear as much
information as possible about the juvenile in order to render a suitable disposition. Id. at 153.
A juvenile offender is categorized as a delinquent, rather than a criminal. See supra note 30.
Finally, juvenile court proceedings are kept confidential to prevent the juvenile from suffering
the stigma of a criminal record. See Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 101 (1958); Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling Upon Youths in the Juvenile
Justice System: A Review of the Evidence, 8 L. & Soc'Y REV. 583 (1974).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (1983).
36. See id. § 702-7(3), which provides in pertinent part:
If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of an act which
constitutes a crime under the laws of this State, and, on motion of the State's
Attorney a Juvenile Judge, designated by the Chief Judge of the Circuit to hear
and determine such motions ... finds that it is not in the best interests of the
minor or of the public to proceed under this Act, the court may enter an order
permitting prosecution under the criminal laws.
37. See People v. Caudell, 28 Ill. App. 3d 916, 329 N.E.2d 802 (5th Dist. 1975).
38. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (1983 & Supp. 1984). If a juvenile court judge
makes such an objection, the chief judge of the circuit court ultimately decides how the juvenile
will be prosecuted. See People v. Brookshaw, 12 Iil. App. 3d 221, 225, 299 N.E.2d 20, 24 (3d
Dist. 1973).
39. See 81st General Assembly of Illinois, Senate Debates, May 21, 1979 at 52-53 (available
from Illinois Secretary of State).
One ... of the evils, I think, of the [juvenile court] system is that an angry
prosecutor in retribution can even on the first offense take a juvenile offender and
try him as an adult and the reason that most of them do it, is because they don't
really have alternatives in dealing with them ....
Id. (statement of Sen. DeAngelis).
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Two policy concerns influenced the Illinois General Assembly's reforma-
tion of the state's juvenile justice system. First, some lawmakers criticized
the breadth of the prosecutor's discretion in handling juvenile offenders.
State officials expressed concern that juveniles who had not committed
serious or violent offenses could be prosecuted as adults. 40 Second, the
General Assembly sought to protect the public from juvenile offenders who
regularly commit serious offenses, but who were not prosecuted as adults.
4
'
These concerns contributed to the passage of the Habitual Juvenile Offender
Act in 1979.42 Although juvenile rehabilitation was the predominant goal,
the Act also reduced prosecutorial discretion and increased juvenile sentences
to protect society from repeat offenders. The Act applies only to juvenile
offenders who commit a third offense identified as a serious crime in the
statute,4 3 and imposes a mandatory sentence of incarceration until the age
of twenty-one for any juvenile adjudged a habitual juvenile offender."
Under the Act, a juvenile offender with three adjudications of delinquency45
is committed to a correctional facility.4 6 Once committed to the facility, there
is no possibility of parole.4 7 The period of confinement is determined by
subtracting the date of commitment from the date of the habitual juvenile
offender's twenty-first birthday.40 The habitual juvenile offender, however,
may lessen the period of confinement by earning one day of good conduct
credit for each day served.4 9 The statute allows the state to choose between
prosecuting a juvenile offender as an adult or as a habitual juvenile of-
fender.5 0 If the state elects the first alternative, the juvenile court judge must
40. Id. at 53.
41. See 81st General Assembly of Illinois, House Debates, June 21, 1979 at 104 (available
from Illinois Secretary of State).
[Tihat kid with 12 or 14 felonies to his string who goes out and commits aggravated
rape or goes out and commits armed robbery, or yes, even murder, [should be] put
• . . in the Department of Corrections with no chance of payroll [sic] in a juvenile
detention facility until his 21st birthday. Rehabilitation has not worked and society
deserves to be protected from this repeat felon.
Id. (remarks of Rep. Davis).
42. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12 (1983 & Supp. 1984). Although Public Act 81-1104
enacting the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act does not contain a statement of the purpose of
the Act, it is clear from both the Senate and House debates that these concerns were key factors
in promulgating the statute.
43. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a)(4) (1983 & Supp. 1984). See supra note 6.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984). See supra note 5.
45. See supra notes 4, 6-7 and accompanying text.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 705-12(a). Section 705-12(a) states that "commitment as an Habitual Juvenile
Offender shall be . . . the difference between the date of commitment and the minor's 21st
birthday . I..." Id
49. Id. § 705-12(a). The habitual juvenile offender statute requires that the same procedures
used to determine the allowance or revocation of good conduct credit for adult prisoners also
apply in determining good conduct credit for habitual juvenile offenders. Id.
50. Id.
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determine whether the interests of the juvenile and the public are better
served by prosecuting the juvenile as an adult." If the state chooses the
second alternative, the juvenile court judge must determine whether the
prerequisites for prosecuting the juvenile as a habitual juvenile offender are
met.5 2 The Habitual Juvenile Offender Act is the only statute under the
Juvenile Court Act that mandates a right to trial by jury for a juvenile.53 A
juvenile prosecuted as a habitual juvenile offender may waive the right to a
jury trial by demanding a bench trial, in open court and with the advice of
counsel .14
51. See supra note 36.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(c) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
Section 705-12(c) provides:
If the court finds that the prerequisites established in Section (a) hereof have been
proven, it shall adjudicate the minor an Habitual Juvenile Offender and commit
him to the Department of Corrections until his 21st birthday, without possibility
of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence.
Id.
The decision whether to prosecute a juvenile as an adult or as a habitual juvenile offender
is significant because the sentences imposed under each alternative may vary. For example, if
the state decided to prosecute a thirteen year old juvenile as an adult for committing a third
robbery, the convicted juvenile would face a sentence of three to seven years in a correctional
facility. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(5) (1983) (robbery is a class 2 felony, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 18-1 (1983)). If the state prosecuted the same juvenile as a habitual juvenile
offender, the juvenile would face a mandatory sentence of eight years in a correctional facility,
with no possibility of parole. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984). If the
juvenile's counsel perceives this dilemma, they may file a motion to have the case transferred
from juvenile to adult court. Id. § 702-7(5).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984); see Scott, Delinquency and
Due Process: A Review of Illinois Law, 59 CHI.[-]KENT. L. REV. 123, 132 (1982).
Many constitutional privileges enjoyed by adults in criminal proceedings have been applied
to juveniles in delinquency proceedings. Since the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding is entitled to the following: (1) proper
notice of the charges, id. at 33-34; (2) a right to counsel, id. at 34-42; (3) a right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, id. at 42-46; and (4) a privilege against self-incrimination, id. at
55. Numerous commentators have discussed the Gault decision's impact on the juvenile court
system. See GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE JUVENILE COURT? (V. Nordin ed. 1968); Note,
Constitutional Law-Extension of Due Process Guarantees to Juveniles, 14 Loy. L. REV. 195
(1968); Note, Constitutional Rights of Juveniles: Gault and Its Application, 9 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 492 (1968); The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 112, 171 (1967).
The United States Supreme Court, however, subsequently ruled that the due process clause
does not require trial by jury in state juvenile court delinquency proceedings. McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). The Illinois Supreme Court has also ruled that under
the Juvenile Court Act, a juvenile does not have a right to trial by jury. People ex rel. Carey
v. Whit, 65 Ill. 2d 193, 202, 357 N.E.2d 512, 516 (1976). Thus, the Habitual Juvenile Offender
Act is unique in affording a juvenile a right to trial by jury.
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(b) (1983 & Supp. 1984). Section 705-12(b) provides in
pertinent part that "[tirial . . . shall be by jury unless the minor demands, in open court and
with advice of counsel, a trial by the court without jury." Id.
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The procedures of the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act resemble those of
Illinois' adult habitual criminal statute." The policies behind these acts
nevertheless differ. The primary purpose behind sentencing juvenile offenders
is to rehabilitate them.5 6 The primary purpose for imposing sanctions on
adult criminals, however, is to protect society.5 7 Under the adult habitual
criminal statute, upon a third conviction for a class X felony or murder, an
offender is adjudged a habitual criminal.58 The adult habitual criminal statute
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B-l(a) (1983). The statute provides:
Every person who has been twice convicted in any state or federal court of an
offense that contains the same elements as an offense now classified in Illinois as
a Class X felony or murder, and is thereafter convicted of a Class C felony or
murder, committed after the 2 prior convictions, shall be adjudged an habitual
criminal.
Id.
56. See supra notes 2, 23 and accompanying text. See also 81st General Assembly of Illinois,
Senate Debates, May 21, 1979 at 53 (available from Illinois Secretary of State) (statement of
Sen. Washington): "[Tihe basic philosophy for treating juveniles ... slightly different . . . was
that young people are more rehabilitatible [sic] than older people."
57. There are several justifications for punishing adult criminals. The deterrence policy, the
most important justification, treats punishment as a means of discouraging others from similarly
violating the law so that society may be protected from further crime. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (3d ed. 1975). Another justification
for punishment is to restrain the criminal from committing further crimes. Id. This theory is
vital to the protection of society, because it is based on preventing criminals with "dangerous
criminal tendencies [from being] in a position where [they] can give indulgence to such
propensities . . . which no community should suffer ..... Id. Furthermore, reformation or
rehabilitation of the criminal is a justification for imposing punishment. Id. at 2. The objective
of the reform theory is that a person's criminal disposition can be corrected with psychological
treatment and isolation from the community. Id. at 36. Some methods of rehabilitation include
instilling the offender with moral guilt, training the offender in work skills, and providing
psychotherapy. Id. Finally, retribution is a justification for punishment. Id. at 2. This theory
of punishment rests solely upon the foundation of revenge. Id.
The general purposes of the Illinois criminal code are to:
(a)Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses;
(b)Define adequately the act and mental state which constitute each offense, and
limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault;
(c)Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and
which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual
offenders; and
(d)Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of
offenses.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-2 (1983). Equal consideration is placed on both the preventative
and rehabilitative purposes. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (Committee
Comments, 1961).
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B-l(a) (1983). The Illinois Class X Felony Act became
effective on Febuary 1, 1978. This class of felonies includes the following offenses: (1) murder
or attempt to commit murder, id. § 8-4(c)(1); (2) aggravated kidnapping for ransom, id. § 10-
2(b)(l); (3) exploitation of a child, id. § 11-19.2(c); (4) aggravated criminal sexual assault, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-14(c) (Supp. 1984); (5) heinous battery, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-
4.1(b) (1983); (6) home invasion, id. § 12-11(b) (1983); (7) aggravated arson, id. § 20-1.1(b);
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mandates a life sentence for anyone adjudged a habitual criminal.5 9 A
mandatory sentence is thus imposed under both the Habitual Juvenile Of-
fender Act and the adult habitual criminal statute. 60 The juvenile's sentence,
however, terminates upon the juvenile's reaching the age of twenty-one. 6'
Shortly after the Act became law, 62 the Illinois Supreme Court, in People
ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 63 held that the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act as
a whole was constitutional.6 First, the court decided that the juvenile's
right to a jury trial was not violated, even though a jury did not sit in the
previous adjudications of delinquency. 6 Because the prior adjudications were
rehabilitative in nature, the right to a jury trial was held not to be required
in juvenile proceedings. 66 The court also held that the Act did not violate
due process by imposing punishment without a jury trial. The Act provided
for the incarceration of juvenile offenders on the basis of two prior adju-
dications of delinquency by bench rather than jury trials. 67 The Chrastka
court concluded that the General Assembly incorporated a right to trial by
jury in the, Act by providing for jury trials in habitual juvenile offender
prosecutions. 6 The court further held that the habitual juvenile offender
statute did not violate due process by allowing the state's attorney to
prosecute juveniles as habitual offenders since the statute contained guidelines
which limited the prosecutor's discretion. 69
(8) armed robbery, id. § 18-1(b); (9) unlawful discharge of metal piercing bullets, id. § 24-
3.2(b); (10) treason, id. § 30-1(c); (11) armed violence, id. § 33A-3(a); (12) certain narcotics
violations, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, § 1401(A) (1983 & Supp. 1984); and (13) calculated
criminal drug conspiracy, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1405(a) (1983).
The penalty for commission of a class X felony ranges from six to thirty years. Id. § 1005-
8-(a)(3). For a more detailed discussion of the class X felony law, see Aspen, New Class X
Sentencing Law: An Analysis, 66 ILL. B.J. 344 (1978).
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B-l(e) (1983) provides "[ejxcept when the death penalty is
imposed, anyone adjudged an habitual criminal shall be sentenced to life imprisonment." Id.
60. Id; see supra note 5.
61. See supra note 5. Representative Davis, who was the House sponsor of the habitual
juvenile offender bill, S.B. 790, argued that the proposed bill differed from the adult habitual
criminal statute because "release at 21 is mandated." 81st General Assembly of Illinois, House
Debates, June 19, 1979 at 23 (available from Illinois Secretary of State).
62. The Act became law on October 31, 1979. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12 (1981).
63. 83 Ill. 2d 67, 413 N.E.2d 1269 (1980).
64. Id. at 74, 413 N.E.2d at 1275-77.
65. Id. at 74-75, 413 N.E.2d at 1273.
66. Id. at 74, 413 N.E.2d at 1273.
67. Id. at 75, 413 N.E.2d at 1275.
68. Id. at 74, 413 N.E.2d at 1274. The court also found that the filing of a petition for
adjudication as a habitual juvenile offender did not properly apprise a jury of prior adjudi-
cations. Id. at 76, 413 N.E.2d at 1274. Furthermore, use of prior adjudications to impeach
was held constitutional. Id. at 76-77, 413 N.E.2d at 1274.
69. Id. at 78, 413 N.E.2d at 1275-76. The court also rejected various other constitutional
arguments. It concluded that the statute did not usurp the function of the judiciary, under the
federal and Illinois constitutions, by delegating the choice of courts to the prosecutor. Id. at
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Finally, the court rejected the argument that the mandatory sentence in
this case was cruel and unusual punishment. 0 Although the Chrastka court
rejected the cruel and unusual punishment argument, the United States
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Solem v. Helm7 compels a reas-
sessment of the Chrastka decision .7  The Court in Solem announced a test
for determining whether a particular sentence was cruel and unusual, as
measured by its disproportionality to the offense. 7 The Solem test mandates
that courts use certain objective factors. 74 First, the court must compare the
gravity of the offense to the harshness of the penalty. 7 In determining the
gravity of the offense, courts may consider the harm caused or threatened
to the victim or society.7 6 When measuring the harm caused or threatened,
courts should evaluate the seriousness of the crime7 7 by comparing the offense
charged with similar offenses.7 1 In addition, courts may consider the cul-
pability of the offender.7 9 When determining culpability, courts should ex-
amine the intent or motive of the offender in committing the crime.80 Second,
the Solem Court required sentencing courts to compare the sentence in the
subject case to sentences imposed in other cases for the same crime in the
79, 413 N.E.2d at 1276. The court also rejected the argument that the statute violated the
Illinois constitutional command that the state criminal justice system restore offenders to "useful
citizenship." Id. (citing ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 11). Finally, the court found no equal protection
violations in the sentencing scheme that gave younger offenders longer sentences than older
offenders. 83 III. 2d at 80-81, 413 N.E.2d at 1276.
70. Id. at 81, 413 N.E.2d at 1276.
71. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
72. 103 S. Ct. at 3010 n.17. Jerry Helm, respondent, was convicted of issuing a "no
account" check for $100.00. Id. at 3005. Helm had six prior convictions: three convictions of
third-degree burglary, one conviction of obtaining money under false pretenses, one conviction
of grand larceny, and one conviction of a third offense, driving while intoxicated. Id. at 3004.
Because Helm had at least three prior convictions, he was subject to South Dakota's recidivist
statute. Id. at 3005. The South Dakota circuit court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment
without parole. This was the maximum penalty that could be imposed on a defendant who was
subject to the recidivist statute. Id.
73. Id. at 3010. See Note, Solem v. Helm: Proportionality Review of Recidivist Sentencing
is Required By the Eighth Amendment, 33 DE PAUL L. REv. 149 (1983): "In construing the
cruel and unusual punishments clause, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized
that a punishment should be proportional to the crime for which it is imposed." Id. at 149.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 3011. The Court noted that courts were competent to determine the gravity of
an offense since courts have traditionally made these judgments. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. For example, courts are justified in viewing armed robbery as more serious than
robbery. Id. Courts may also consider the magnitude of the crime: "Stealing a million dollars
is viewed as more serious than stealing a hundred dollars." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. For example, most courts would conclude that negligent conduct is less serious than
intentional conduct. Id. Furthermore, most courts would find murder more serious if it were
committed pursuant to a contract as opposed to being committed out of passion. Id.
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same jurisdiction. 81 Courts may consider whether more aggravated crimes
are subject to the same penalty or lesser penalties.12 Finally, courts must
compare the sentence imposed in the particular case to sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. 83 One factor in this
comparison is whether the defendant can be parolled before the end of the
scheduled sentence.8 4 The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
applied the Solem standard in a juvenile case, People v. J.A.
THE J.A. DECISION
Facts and Procedural History
On August 31, 1982, J.A. and three friends spotted Jeffery Pryor while
walking down 55th and Garfield Streets on Chicago's south side.85 Pryor
was accosted by the teenagers, one of whom was J.A;86 Pryor was robbed
of ten dollars and a bag of chicken.8 7 The police later arrested J.A. and his
friends.
8
81. Id. at 3010.
82. Id. Although it is difficult to determine whether the length of a particular sentence is
disproportionate to the offense, courts are competent to make these judgments. Id. at 3011-
12.
83. Id. at 3011. The court stated that it was proper for courts to "look to the practices in
other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences should be drawn." Id. at 3012.
84. Id. at 3014. The court of appeals reviewed the life imprisonment sentence imposed on
Helm and considered the nature of his sentence and sentences imposed for commission of the
same offense in other states. Id. at 3006. The court concluded that the sentence imposed on
Helm was "grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." Id! The court of appeals
directed the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state resentenced Helm.Id.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment
question. Id. The Court applied its three-part test to determine whether the sentence imposed
on Helm was so disproportionate that it violated the Eighth Amendment, and concluded the
following: (1) that Helm's no account check for $100.00 was among the less serious offenses
and that Helm's sentence, life imprisonment without parole, was the most severe punishment
that South Dakota could impose on any criminal, except for capital punishment, id. at 3012-
13; (2) that there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was
not authorized, id. at 3014; and (3) that the sentence imposed on Helm was much more severe
than sentences imposed for commission of the same offense in 48 out of 50 other states. Id.
at 3014-15. Thus, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. Id.
at 3016. For a more detailed discussion of the Solem decision, see 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 177
(1984), The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 70, 127 (1984), and 74 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1372 (1983).
85. Brief for Appellant at 8, People v. J.A., 127 Il. App. 3d 811, 469 N.E.2d 449 (1st
Dist. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief].
86. 127 Ill. App. 3d at 813, 469 N.E.2d at 450. When they approached Pryor, the victim,
Daniels attempted to snatch the bag of chicken from him. Pryor, however, refused to give up
his food. Appellant's Brief, supra note 85, at 8.
87. 127 Ill. App. 3d at 813, 469 N.E.2d at 450.
88. Appellant's Brief, supra note 85, at 9.
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J.A. was charged with robbery, having allegedly taken ten dollars and
food from Jeffrey Pryor by force.8 9 The juvenile court granted the state's
motion to prosecute J.A., a thirteen-year-old, under the Habitual Juvenile
Offender Act9° because J.A. had two prior adjudications for robbery when
he was age twelve. 91 J.A. testified that he was ten feet from the incident and
did not participate. 92 Two of J.A.'s friends, who were present at the incident,
corroborated this testimony. 93 After a hearing on J.A.'s alleged delinquent
conduct, J.A. was adjudicated a ward of the court 94 and subsequently
committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until
his twenty-first birthday. 95
The Appellate Court's Rationale
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that the
trial court properly allowed the state to use J.A.'s prior adjudications of
delinquency in invoking the habitual juvenile offender statute, even though
those adjudications occurred when J.A. was twelve. 96 The appellate court
also held that the sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 97
Under Illinois law, a juvenile younger than age thirteen cannot, under any
circumstances, be prosecuted as an adult. 98 J.A. argued that under this theory
the application of the habitual juvenile offender statute was restricted to
delinquency adjudications that occurred between the ages of thirteen and
seventeen" because the prior adjudications of delinquency must have been
for "offenses which had [the juvenile] been prosecuted as an adult, would
have been felonies. -100 The state argued that the habitual juvenile offender
statute classifies not by age, but by the type of crime.10' To interpret the
89. 127 III. App. 3d at 812, 469 N.E.2d at 450.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
91. 127 Ill. App. 3d at 812, 469 N.E.2d at 450. J.A.'s prior adjudications occurred in
October and December, 1981, when he was twelve years old for two robberies that totalled
$36.00. Id. at 815, 469 N.E.2d at 452.
92. Appellant's Brief, supra note 85, at 8.
93. Id.
94. 127 III. App. 3d at 812, 469 N.E.2d at 450.
95. Appellant's Brief, supra note 85, at 5.
96. 127 I1. App. 3d at 813-14, 469 N.E.2d at 451.
97. Id. at 814-15, 469 N.E.2d at 452.
98. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
99. Id. at 813-14, 469 N.E.2d at 451. Appellant argued that since he was twelve years old
at the time of his two prior adjudications, he could not be prosecuted as an adult under any
circumstances. Thus, the requirements of § 705-12 were not met. Section 705-12(a) provides in
pertinent part: "Any minor having been twice adjudicated a delinquent minor for offenses
which had he been prosecuted as an adult, would have been felonies under the laws of this
State ... shall be judged an Habitual Juvenile Offender .... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-
12(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
101. 127 III. App. 3d at 813, 469 N.E.2d at 451.
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language of the statute, the court applied the "plain and ordinary meaning"
standard. 0 2 Under this standard, the court concluded that the statutory
language described the type of offense that must be committed before
invoking the Habitual Juvenile Offender Act.10 Since J.A.'s prior adjudi-
cations were for robbery, a crime identified in the Act, the adjudications
could serve as bases for adjudication under the Act.
J.A. also argued that the imposition of an eight year sentence was cruel
and unusual punishment for robbing another boy of ten dollars and a bag
of chicken.' °0 The J.A. court concluded that the Solem standard should be
applied to determine whether the sentence was cruel and unusual. 05 The
court applied the Solem criteria to test the sentence's proportionality: the
gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the penalty, the sentence
imposed on others for the same crime in the same jurisdiction, and the
sentence imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.'06 The court
concluded that robbery was a sufficiently serious offense to support the
sentence imposed. Moreover, the severity of the sentence was justified be-
cause the defendant was a recidivist. The court therefore determined that
the sentence imposed was not cruel and unusual.'0 7
ANALYSIS
The J.A. court used the wrong process to interpret the Habitual Juvenile
Offender Act and incorrectly applied the "plain and ordinary meaning"
rule. The plain meaning rule applies only to language that is plain and
unambiguous. 0° The language of the habitual juvenile offender statute,
however, is ambiguous. According to section 705-12(a) of the statute, to be
a habitual juvenile offender, a juvenile must have two prior adjudications
of delinquency for "offenses which, had he been prosecuted as an adult,
102. Id.
103. Id. at 814, 469 N.E.2d at 451. The J.A. court, relying on Chrastka, also rejected J.A.'s
argument that consideration of his prior adjudications denied him due process and equal
protection. J.A. argued that "had his prior offenses occurred after his 13th birthday, he could
have transferred the cases to the criminal court to be tried as an adult, thereby circumventing
the habitual juvenile offender statute." Id.
Furthermore, J.A. argued that the statute "illogically imposes the harshest and longest penalty
on the young and least serious offender." Id. However, in rejecting this argument, the J.A.
court stated: "We do not believe that the fortuitous disparity of the terms of confinement of
habitual juvenile offenders which results from the variance in age of such individuals serves to
invalidate the means chosen to effectuate the purpose of the Act." Id.
104. Id. at 814, 469 N.E.2d at 452.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 815, 469 N.E.2d at 452.
107. Id.
108. See 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 46.01 (4th ed. 1984). The
plain meaning rule is applied, "[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning ...." Id. at 73.
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would have been felonies. "' The emphasized language is ambiguous because
it is susceptible to at least two interpretations. First, the language could be
interpreted as defining the type of offense that the juvenile must commit in
order to invoke the habitual juvenile offender statute. Under this interpre-
tation, any prior adjudication of delinquency for such an offense could be
used to satisfy the statutory prerequisite, as was done in the J.A. case. A
second interpretation of the language is that the clause requires both that
the juvenile be at least thirteen and subject to prosecution as an adult,' 0
and that the juvenile have committed the type of offense included in the
Habitual Juvenile Offender Act. The J.A. court should not have applied the
plain meaning rule to interpret the statute because the language of the statute
is susceptible to more than one meaning."'
The J.A. court's interpretation of one clause in the statute also did not
give effect to the language of the statute as a whole." 2 The phrase "prose-
cuted as an adult," as applied in the statute, is meaningless under the J.A.
court's interpretation. The court concluded that the statute's language, as a
whole," 3 defines only the type of crime to which the statute will apply.
Through this interpretation, the court gave effect to the words "would have
been felonies" while neglecting the words "prosecuted as an adult." Such
erroneous application of the plain meaning rule renders the court's interpre-
tation of the statute suspect.
Another problem with the J.A. decision is the court's sketchy application
of the Solem standard in its determination of whether the sentence imposed
was disproportionately severe. The J.A. court's discussion of the first factor,
the gravity of the offense," 4 is incomplete. The Solem Court stated that in
determining the gravity of the offense, courts should consider the harm
caused or threatened to the victim or society." 5 Courts should compare the
harm caused to society by the offense committed with the harm caused by
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-12(a) (1983 & Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
110. See supra note 16. The Illinois criminal code requires anyone charged with committing
a crime to have reached the age of thirteen at the time the crime was committed in order to
be prosecuted as an adult. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-1 (1983).
I1l. See H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS
55 (2d ed. 1911) (plain meaning rule should not be used to interpret statutes that are susceptible
to more than one interpretation).
112. See 2A N. SINGER, supra note 108. "It is an elementary rule of construction that effect
must be given . . . to every word, clause and sentence of a statute. A statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant. ... Id. at 104. (footnotes omitted). See also G. ENDLICH, A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 29 (1888) (a construction that fails to give effect to
every word is rejected).
113. See supra note 105.
114. 127 Ill. App. 3d at 815, 469 N.E.2d at 452. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07
for the court's application of the Solem standard.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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other offenses.' 6 The J.A. court did not conduct this comparison. The court
did not compare the harm caused by the robbery in this case to the harm
caused by similar crimes. For example, had the court compared the subject
robbery to armed robbery, it would have concluded that armed robbery is
a more serious offense." 7 J.A. should therefore have been sentenced to less
time than would have been -appropriate in an armed robbery. Furthermore,
J.A.'s involvement in the robbery was passive and slight." 8 The J.A. court
should have considered J.A.'s minimal culpability and lessened the gravity
of the offense. The court also failed to consider the magnitude of the
defendant's crime." 9 A proper analysis, under Solem, would have considered
all of these factors. The fact reveal that the gravity of the offense committed
by J.A. was not severe.
The J.A. court also ommitted an analysis of the second factor in the
Solem standard: comparison of the sentence to other sentences imposed on
criminals in the same jurisdiction. 20 In conducting this analysis, courts should
consider whether more serious crimes are subject to the same or lesser
penalties.' 2' In Illinois, the average sentence for voluntary manslaughter was
estimated at 5.1 years in 1980. 22 The estimated average sentence for burglary
was 3.8 years. 23 The estimated average sentence for armed robbery was 10.0
116. Id.
117. See Dembowski v. State, 125 Ind. 250, 252, 240 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery
more serious than robbery).
118. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
119. 103 S. Ct. at 3011. Cf. supra note 78 (one hundred dollar theft not as serious as one
million dollar theft). In Solem, the Court found that Helm's $100.00 no-account check was
not a large amount. Id. at 3013.
120. 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
121. Id.
122. See ILLINOIS CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1982 REPORT 33 (1982). These statistics
are based on offenses committed in 1980. Id. The average sentence for voluntary manslaughter
increased from 5.0 years in 1978 to 5.1 years in 1980. Id. According to ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 9-2(c) (1983), voluntary manslaughter is a class I felony. The penalty for commission of
a class I felony ranges from four to fifteen years. Id. § 1005-8-1(a)(4).
The Illinois Criminal Sentencing Commission Report publishes statistics on the number of
offenses committed by adults with prior records, including juvenile, misdemeanor, and felony
records. ILLINOIS CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1982 REPORT 65 (1982). There is no
comparable report that compiles the sentences imposed on juvenile offenders in Illinois. The
adult statistics must substitute for the unavailable comparable juvenile statistics. Because the
primary purpose of incarcerating juveniles is rehabilitation, see supra note 2, they should not
be treated more severely than adults.
123. ILLINOIS CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1982 REPORT 33 (1982). The average sentence
for burglary decreased from 3.9 years in 1978 to 3.8 years in 1980. Id.
According to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 19-1(b)(1983), burglary is a class 2 felony. The penalty
for commission of a class 2 felony ranges from three to seven years. Id. § 1005-8-1(a)(5)(1983).
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years. 24 Because J.A. received a much higher sentence than criminals who
have committed crimes more serious than robbery, the J.A. court's omission
of this analysis is a serious flaw in its review.
Finally, the J.A. court did not address the third factor of the Solem test:
comparison of the sentence to sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.' 2 In New York, for example, the estimated
average minimum sentence for robbery in 1982 was 3.2 years and the
estimated average maximum was 7.6 years. 2 6 In California, the estimated
average sentence for robbery in 1981 was 4.7 years.'2 7 In Indiana, a fixed
sentence of 5.0 years is imposed for committing robbery.' After considering
these findings, the J.A. court should have concluded that J.A. would have
received a less severe sentence in several other states.
Instead of applying the three-factor Solem test, the court in J.A. merely
asserted that the Solem requirements were met. 29 This conclusion is troubling
because the J.A. court failed to provide any analysis to support it. The court
should have applied the Solem standard in its entirety 30 and concluded that
the eight-year sentence imposed on J.A. was severely disproportionate and
therefore constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The decision in J.A. also conflicts with the underlying policies of the
juvenile court system. The purposes behind the Juvenile Court Act are clear:
to protect and rehabilitate juveniles.' 3' The eight-year sentence imposed on
J.A. is not rehabilitative. Several scholars who have studied the effects of
long sentences on juveniles have concluded that longer sentences are coun-
terproductive to rehabilitation.' Because the primary policy underlying the
124. ILLINOIS CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1982 REPORT 33 (1982). The average sentence
for armed robbery increased from 8.8 in 1978 to 10.0 in 1980. Id. According to ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 18-2(b) (1983), armed robbery is a class X felony. The penalty for commission
of a class X felony ranges from 6 to 30 years. Id. § 1005-8-1(a)(3).
125. See Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
126. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT, SENTENCING
PRACTICES IN 13 STATES 6 (1984). These estimates are based on the 1982 figures.
127. Id. at 7. These estimates are based on the 1979 and 1981 figures.
128. See IND. CODE § 35-45-5-1 (1979) (robbery is a class C felony); id. § 35-50-2-6 (penalty
for commission of a class C felony is fixed at five years).
129. 127 III. App. 3d at 815, 469 N.E.2d at 452.
130. See Whitmore v. Maggio, 742 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure of district court to
conduct a Solem analysis to determine whether consecutive sentences of 75 years and 50 years
was cruel and unusual punishment. resulted in case being remanded).
13 1. See supra note 2.
132. See C. BARTOLLAS & S. MILLER, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER: CONTROL, CORRECTION, AND
TREATMENT (1978); C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER & S. DINITZ, JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION: THE
INSTITUTIONAL PARADOX (1976); B. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS
IN INSTITUTIONS (1977); H. POLSKY, COTTAGE SIx (1962). Incarcerating a juvenile offender for
a long period of time can impair the juvenile's rehabilitation. See Hoffman, Purposes and
Philosophy of Sentencing, 75 F.R.D. 287, 293 (1977) (incarcerating juvenile beyond time that
institutional staff and parole authorities consider adequate can hurt juvenile). This is because
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criminal code is to protect society from adult criminals,'33 long sentences for
adult criminals may be justified. The predominant policy in the juvenile
court system, however, is to rehabilitate juvenile offenders. Therefore, in
determining the length of a sentence, a competent juvenile court should take
into consideration the negative effect that a long incarceration period will
have on the juvenile offender. 34 The J.A. court failed to consider this effect.
The J.A. court's key aim was apparently to protect society from J.A., rather
than to rehabilitate him. Because the court failed to consider the rehabilitative
effect of the sentence imposed, the J.A. decision conflicts with the underlying
policies of the juvenile court system.
IMPACT
One of the effects of the J.A. decision is that it will contribute to increasing
sentence disparity in juvenile court proceedings.' By misapplying the plain
meaning rule, the court concluded that the habitual juvenile offender statute
may be applied to all prior adjudications of a juvenile delinquent. If future
juvenile courts follow this construction of the habitual juvenile offender
statute, prior adjudications of delinquency that occurr when a juvenile was
younger than thirteen years old would satisfy the prerequisites of the stat-
ute. 36 Thus, .a juvenile who has two prior adjudications of delinquency at
the basic nature of juvenile correctional facilities, in particular, maximum security training
schools, is criminogenic. See Bartollas & Sieverdes, Juvenile Correctional Institutions: A Policy
Statement, 46 FED. PROBATION 22, 23 (1982). These correctional facilities become "schools of
crime" due to the inhumane treatment received by juveniles from other incarcerees and the
compromises that staff members make with juveniles over unlawful conduct. Id. Consequently,
the recidivist rates for these correctional facilities is high, Id. Approximately half of the juveniles
released from correctional facilities are reincarcerated. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 142 (1967).
133. See supra note 57.
134. See supra note 132.
135. The causes of sentence disparity are related to the judiciary's exercise of discretion in
setting sentences. By allowing the judiciary a "zone of discretion" in determining the lengths
of sentences, disparity results. See Haddad, Commentary: Some Lessons From the History of
Illinois Sentencing Laws, 2 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 19, 25 (1981). Disparity is further amplified by
the courts' authority to choose an alternative to incarceration. Id. at 28. Probation, conditional
discharge, and work release are some examples of alternatives to incarceration. Id. at 27. When
a court must choose "between probation and, for example, a four-year ... sentence, the
possibility of disparity is greatly increased." Id. at 28.
Furthermore, there is evidence that courts have utilized legally irrelevant factors such as social
characteristics in making sentence determinations. See Thornberry, Sentencing Disparities in the
Juvenile Justice System, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 164 (1979). Irrelevant and even
discriminatory factors, such as race and socioeconomic status, have been relied upon by the
courts, and increase the opportunity for disparate sentencing. Id. In his 1973 study, Thornberry
concluded that blacks and members of the lower socioeconomic strata received more severe
sentences in the juvenile court system than whites and members of the higher socioeconomic
strata, when the "legally relevant variables of the seriousness of the offense and the individual's
prior delinquent record were held constant." Id.
136. For prerequisites of the statute, see supra note 5.
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the age of nine, and who is adjudged a habitual juvenile offender upon the
third adjudication of delinquency at the age of ten, would be incarcerated
in a correctional facility for eleven years without parole.'" In contrast, a
juvenile who has two prior adjudications of delinquency at the age of sixteen,
and who is adjudged a habitual juvenile offender upon the third adjudication
of delinquency at the age of seventeen, would be incarcerated in a correctional
facility for only four years.'38 Since a juvenile at age ten is probably more
subject to rehabilitation than a juvenile at age seventeen, the result is
anomalous. Future juvenile courts that follow the J.A. court's interpretation
of the habitual juvenile offender statute will impose disparate sentences upon
juveniles because younger juvenile offenders will always receive longer sen-
tences than older juvenile offenders.
The J.A. decision will detract from the juvenile court system's goal to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders.' 39 Rehabilitation will be frustrated if future
juvenile courts follow the J.A. court's approach to the Solem analysis. The
J.A. court's incorrect application of the Solem standard allowed the impo-
sition of a sentence that was cruel and unusual, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Juvenile offenders will not be rehabilitated by imposing sen-
tences that are cruel and unusual. The J.A. court also placed too much
emphasis on protecting society from the habitual juvenile offender. Reha-
bilitation efforts will be frustrated if sentencing courts focus primarily on
protecting society rather than on rehabilitating the juvenile. Consequently,
the rehabilitation goals of the juvenile court system will be subverted if
future courts follow the J.A. decision and neglect the rehabilitative goals of
sentencing.
There are three solutions to the problems posed by the J.A. court's
construction of the Habitual Juvenile Offenders Act. First, other courts can
apply the Solem test more precisely than the J.A. court did, in order to
mitigate the possible harshness of sentences imposed under the Act. Second,
the General Assembly can amend the statute to eliminate the ambiguity. The
General Assembly can limit the types of convictions that can be used to
support the prosecution of a juvenile under the Act. Finally, the General
Assembly can repeal the Act, since it has proven to be unfair and counter-
productive in practice.
CONCLUSION
The J.A. court held that prior adjudications of delinquency that occur
before a juvenile reaches the age of thirteen can be used to invoke the
Habitual Juvenile Offender Act. The court erred in applying the plain
meaning rule to ambiguous language in the statute. By interpreting the
137. See supra note 5.
138. Id.
139. See supra note 2.
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statute to apply to all prior adjudications of delinquency, regardless of the
age of the juvenile when the adjudications occurred, the decision will increase
disparate sentences among juvenile offenders.
Furthermore, the court held that the mandatory sentence imposed on a
habitual juvenile offender did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Because of the lack of a precise application of the the Solem standard, the
court's holding is erroneous and serves only to enforce a sentence that is
cruel and unusual. The decision undermines the rehabilitation goals of the
juvenile court system. Because the decision placed too much emphasis on
protecting society from the juvenile offender rather than on rehabilitating
the juvenile offender, the court set a precedent for ignoring the policies that
underlie the juvenile court system.
Anna S. Richo

